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Abstract 
 
The standard view on the economic impact of immigration has been criticized for its inability to 
solve the “immigration policy puzzle.” It also has a problem in that the “net” income of 
heterogeneous workers is equalized. These problems arise because the standard view generally 
depends on a production function in which the elasticity of substitution between heterogeneous 
workers is constant. This paper constructs an alternative production function in which the 
elasticity of substitution between heterogeneous workers is not constant and is instead based on a 
model of total factor productivity. The alternative view presented based on this production 
function indicates that an “open door” policy is not necessarily economically optimal for host 
countries under some conditions. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
A number of studies on the economic impact of immigration have been conducted (Altonji and 
Card, 1991; Borjas, 1994, 1999, 2003; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Card, 2005, 2009; Bodvarsson 
and Van den Berg, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). The standard view on the economic impact 
of immigration is that it has positive economic effects as a whole, although it has some negative 
effects on wages for low-skilled workers. Borjas (1999) summarized this view by stating that the 
“immigration surplus” (income gains that accrue to natives) is zero if immigrants have the same 
skill distribution as natives, but it is positive if the skills of immigrants differ from those of natives. 
The surplus is maximized when immigrants are either exclusively skilled or exclusively unskilled.  
 However, Giordani and Ruta (2011) argued that the standard view based on the standard 
production function (Cobb-Douglas or CES) has an important problem, which they called the 
“immigration policy puzzle.” Because immigration surpluses are generally positive, the optimal 
immigration policy is an “open door” policy. That is, a country should accept as many immigrants 
as possible, and it is not rational to limit the entry of immigrants. Giordani and Ruta (2011) argued 
that this is a puzzle, however, because many countries have historically strictly restricted 
immigration. Therefore, there must be some unknown important elements that are not being 
reflected in the standard view, and because of these unknown elements, many countries may have 
to strictly control immigration. 
 The standard production function has another problem if it is combined with the 
assumption that workers are differentiated only by acquirable skills. If acquiring skills is 
endogenized, that is, if the number of skills acquired by a worker is determined at equilibrium 
where the “net” income (income minus costs to acquire skills) is equalized across workers, the 
net income of high- and low-skilled workers becomes identical. In other words, skill levels are 
indifferent to net income. This feature will significantly affect the results of examinations on the 
economic impacts of immigration and thereby affect evaluations of immigration policy because 
it is an essential element in examinations of immigration in the standard view. 
 If all workers are homogenous, the standard production function is very useful. If 
workers are heterogeneous (e.g., high- or low-skilled), however, it may not necessarily be useful 
and, in fact, may be problematic in some cases. In this paper, I present an alternative production 
function that is more useful when workers are heterogeneous because it does not have the nature 
of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) in production among heterogeneous workers, although 
it still does have the nature of CES in production between labor and capital. The function is 
constructed based on the model of total factor productivity (TFP) shown in Harashima (2009, 
2011, 2012) and incorporates TFP elements that cannot be acquired at the same cost by everybody. 
The alternative framework for examining immigration based on this production function leads to 
the following conclusions: there is no guarantee that immigration surpluses will be positive if 
immigrants are less productive workers, and there are several important factors that support 
restricting the number of immigrants. Therefore, an “open door” policy is not necessarily always 
optimal economically for a host country. 
 
2  PROBLEMS WITH THE STANDARD VIEW 
 
2.1  The standard view of the economic impacts of immigration 
The standard view generally relies on the standard production function and implicitly assumes 
that the only difference between high- and low-skilled workers is their skills, which can be 
acquired at the same costs equally by any worker. A typical CES production function is  
 
  qqLSqHSq μLλLKμλAY
1
1  ,                   (1) 
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where Y is outputs, A is technology, K is capital inputs, LHS is labor inputs by high-skilled (HS) 
workers, LLS is labor inputs by low-skilled (LS) workers, and λ, μ, and q are parameters (0 < μ < 
λ < 1, λ + μ < 1 and q ≤ 1). The skill difference is represented by the difference between the 
values of λ and μ. The value of λ is larger than that of μ because HS workers are assumed to have 
more skills than LS workers. If q → 0, the production function degenerates to a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Suppose that capital moves perfectly elastically. Let wHS and wLS be the 
wages for HS and LS workers, respectively. By equation (1), 
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

 . 
 Borjas (1999) summarized the standard view on the effect of immigration as follows. In 
the case of perfectly elastic capital, the impact of immigration on wages depends on how the skill 
distribution of immigrants compares to that of natives. If immigrants are relatively low skilled, 
the wage for low-skilled workers declines and that for high-skilled workers rises, and the reverse 
is true if the immigrants are relatively high skilled. The immigration surplus is zero if immigrants 
have the same skill distribution as natives, but it is positive if immigrants differ from natives. The 
surplus is maximized when the immigrants are either exclusively skilled or exclusively unskilled. 
These predictions imply that immigration has positive economic effects as a whole because 
immigration surpluses are generally positive. 
 
2.2  Problems  
Giordani and Ruta (2011) presented what they called the “immigration policy puzzle” related to 
the standard view. Because the standard view generally indicates that the optimal immigration 
policy is an “open door” policy. However, in actuality, many countries have strictly restricted 
immigration and therefore the standard view does not seem to be fully successful in describing 
actual immigration phenomena.  
 In addition, by equations (2) and (3), 0HSw , 0LSw , and  
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that is, the wage for HS workers is lower than the wage for LS workers. Because 0 < μ < λ < 1 
and q ≤ 1, 
q
μ
λ 


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


1
1
1 and thereby, if LHS is sufficiently larger than LLS, LSHS ww  . If λ and μ 
are nearly equal, then
LSHS ww   even if LHS is only a little larger than LLS. Hence, in these cases, 
HS workers will want to work as LS workers because
LSHS ww   (i.e., skills that HS workers 
obtain do not result in higher wages). By arbitrage, there will be an equilibrium ratio
LS
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L
L
such 
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, and at this equilibrium, 
LSHS ww  . If LHS is sufficiently larger than LLS, 
therefore, the wages of HS and LS workers are always equal. This is particularly so if λ and μ are 
not largely different. 
 Nevertheless, acquiring skills entails costs. Suppose that a worker pays back a loan that 
was borrowed to cover the costs to acquire skills by cS every year. The equilibrium ratio
LS
HS
L
L
 
will be achieved when
LSSHS wcw  . In this way, the net incomes (i.e., income minus the costs 
to acquire skills) of HS and LS workers are equal, and skill level is indifferent to net income. 
 These problems are related to two fundamental questions. First, there is a question about 
the CES between HS and LS workers. Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions have the 
nature of CES in production, and the CES indicates that any factor input is indispensable for 
production. Therefore, as a factor input becomes scarcer, its value and price soar. This relationship 
is very reasonable between labor and capital inputs, but it may not be true between HS and LS 
workers because HS workers can be employed as LS workers if LS workers become scarcer. Note 
that labor cannot be employed as capital, but it can substitute for capital inputs. Therefore, it is 
doubtful that the same nature of CES exists between HS and LS workers as that between labor 
and capital inputs. 
 Second, there is a question about the assumption that the only difference between HS 
and LS workers is skills that can be acquired by any worker equally at the same cost, that is, that 
a worker can freely choose whether to be high skilled or low skilled. In this case, the ratio
LS
HS
L
L
 
is therefore an endogenous variable. The importance of this assumption is easily understood if we 
instead assume that any worker is born as either a HS or LS worker and cannot change from one 
to the other; that is, the ratio
LS
HS
L
L
is exogenously given and fixed. In this case, Cobb-Douglas and 
CES production functions will predict that the phenomenon
LSHS ww  would have been widely 
and frequently observed across countries and time periods. However, the phenomenon 
LSHS ww  is regarded to be very unnatural and has actually been rarely (probably never) 
observed in market-oriented economies. This result indicates that there are factors that 
intrinsically differentiate workers’ abilities other than skills that are equally acquirable at the same 
cost. If such factors exist, it is problematic to use the standard production function to examine 
heterogeneous workers. 
 
2.3  Other important factors that differentiate workers’ wages  
The question arises then, is there a factor(s) that intrinsically differentiates workers’ abilities? 
Studies on TFP imply that such a factor does exist. Neo-classical Ramsey growth models naturally 
predict that the TFPs of economies will eventually converge, but many endogenous growth 
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models (e.g., those based on human capital accumulation) do not necessarily support this 
convergence hypothesis (e.g., Romer, 1986, 1987). Prescott (1998) has shown that arguments 
based on human capital (e.g., acquired skills) are unconvincing. The conclusions of empirical 
studies on the convergence hypothesis are mixed and inconclusive (e.g., Abramovitz, 1986; 
Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992; Bernard and Durlauf, 1995; Michelacci and 
Zaffaroni, 2000; Cheung and Garcia-Pascual, 2004). Prescott (1998) concluded that TFPs differ 
across economies and time for reasons other than differences in the publicly available stock of 
technical knowledge and that a theory of TFP is needed to solve this problem. Harashima (2009, 
2011, 2012) showed a model of TFP based on average workers’ innovative intelligences. An 
important point of this model is that the wages of workers are differentiated not only by skills but 
also by workers’ innovative intelligences. In addition, innovative intelligences will not be 
acquired easily, at least not equally by workers at the same costs. If we take the difference of 
innovative intelligence among workers into consideration, therefore, the standard production 
function may not be appropriate for analyses of economic impacts of immigration.  
 
3  AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR 
EXAMINING IMMIGRATION 
 
3.1  TFP 
3.1.1  A model of TFP  
3.1.1.1  The experience curve effect 
Harashima (2009, 2011, 2012) constructed a model of TFP based on workers’ innovative 
intelligences and the experience curve effect (see the Appendix). The experience curve effect 
states that the more often a task is performed, the lower the cost of doing it. The primary idea of 
the experience curve effect (the “learning curve effect” in earlier literature) dates back to Wright 
(1936), Hirsch (1952), Alchian (1963), and Rapping (1965). Since then, the concept and models 
of the experience curve effect have been widely used in many fields including business 
management, strategy, and organizational studies. The experience curve effect is usually 
expressed as 
 
)1(
1
α
N NCC
 ,                              (4) 
 
where
1C is the cost of the first unit of output of a task, NC is the cost of the Nth unit of output, N 
is the cumulative volume of output and is interpreted as experience of a worker engaging in the 
task, and α is a constant parameter ( 10  α ). 
 
3.1.1.2  The effective factor inputs 
Based on workers’ innovative intelligences and the experience curve effect, the effective 
technology input per unit capital ( A
~
) in production is expressed by 
 
α
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K
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
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
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
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~
,                          (5) 
 
where A is technology, K is capital inputs, 
AW is the effective amount of technology input per 
unit capital when a worker uses a unique combination of varieties of technologies in
K
A
. In 
addition, υA and ωA are positive constant parameters, and α is a positive parameter that is the same 
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as that used in equation (4). ωA indicates the degree of worker’s innovative intelligence with 
regard to technology input (see the Appendix). Equation (5) is the same as equation (A8) in the 
Appendix. 
 Next, the effective labor input ( L
~
) in production is expressed by  
 
α
LLL LωWυL 
~
,                             (6) 
 
where L is labor input, and
LW is the total amount of workers’ effective provision of labor input 
that is lowered by the inefficiency resulting from fragmented and incomplete information. In 
addition, υL and ωL are positive constant parameters. ωL indicates the degree of worker’s 
innovative intelligence with regard to labor input (see the Appendix). Equation (6) is the same as 
equation (A13) in the Appendix. 
 Finally, the effective capital input used by a worker on average ( K
~
) for L1 is 
expressed by 
 
KσK 
~
,                                (7) 
 
where  10  σσ is a positive constant. Equation (7) is the same as equation (A16) in the 
Appendix. σ represents a worker’s accessibility limit to capital with regard to location. The 
average value of σ  in an economy will depend on the availability of physical transportation 
facilities. Location constraints, however, are not limited to physical transportation facilities. For 
example, law enforcement, regulations, the financial system, and other factors will also influence 
accessibility. The value ofσ reflects the combined effects of all of these factors. Establishing 
efficient financial and other institutions (e.g., government) is very important forσ as is investing 
in physical capital (e.g., in transportation). 
 
3.1.1.3  The approximate effective production function and TFP 
By equations (5), (6), and (7), an approximate effective production function (AEPF) can be 
constructed such that  
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                                          
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Equation (8) is the same as equation (A20) in the Appendix. Let ω be
LKωω . Because ωK and ωL 
are both positive, ω is positive and indicates the degree of worker’s innovative intelligence (see 
the Appendix). AEPF is therefore 
 
ααα LKωAσY  1 , 
 
and thereby TFP (PTF) is  
 
α
TF ωAσP  . 
 
Higher σ and ω mean higher degrees of accessibility and worker’s innovative intelligence, 
respectively, and both lead to higher levels of TFP and production. 
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3.1.2  Industrial area, size of the economy, and population density 
3.1.2.1  Industrial area 
Suppose for simplicity that people live and engage in economic activities only in “industrial areas,” 
which are areas where economic activities are sufficiently concentrated and therefore generally 
excludes deserts, deep forests, mountains, and other inaccessible areas. In addition, suppose that 
the density of capital per unit area is identical in all industrial areas, with an upper bound ofσ . 
An increase in the total sum of K indicates an increase in the density of K in the industrial area; 
thus, the portion of K used by a worker also increases at the same rate as K. On the other hand, an 
increase in the total sum of L does not indicate any change in the density of K in the industrial 
area, and the portion of K used by a worker does not change. 
 
3.1.2.2  Economy size  
The economy “size” is defined in this paper as the square measure of each economy’s industrial 
area; that is, it is not the production size but rather the spatial size. For simplicity, it is assumed 
that the population density in the industrialized area is identical across economies, and thereby 
the size of an economy is directly proportionate to its population (or the number of workers). 
Hence, the size of an economy indicates not only the spatial size but also the population size. 
 Let S (> 0) be the size of the economy. As shown above, S is defined independently of 
endogenous variables Y and K by an exogenous variable such as the spatial (or population) size 
of an economy’s industrialized areas. A
~
, K
~
, and L
~
in equation (8) have to be modified to include 
this spatial (population) size of the economy. Suppose that Y, K, L, and S of economy X are YX, 
KX, LX, and SX, respectively, and A is internationally common. The effective capital input needs 
to be changed from
XK
~
to 
X
X
S
K
~
, the effective technology input from
XA
~
to 
X
α
X AS
~
, and the 
effective labor input from
XL
~
to 
X
α
X LS
~1 (see Harashima, 2009, and the Appendix). Hence, AEPF 
modified by the size of economy is 
 
X
α
X
X
X
X
α
XX LS
S
K
ASY
~
~
~ 1  
XXX LKA
~~~
 .                                 (9) 
 
Equation (9) is exactly the same as equation (8), i.e., LKAY
~~~
 . This means that the spatial 
(population) size of economy generally does not matter in terms of the nature of AEPF, and AEPF 
can be applied commonly to large and small economies.1 Note that equation (9) is the same as 
equation (A21) in the Appendix. 
 
3.1.2.3  Population density 
The theory behind the model of TFP in Section 3.1.1 (and see the Appendix) indicates that the 
population density in an industrial area will converge at a certain optimal value through 
competition and arbitration among firms in the long run. The reason for this nature is that a sparser 
population has many effects. It will lower the degree of division of labor and therefore reduce the 
inefficiency due to fragmentation of information, but the advantages of division of labor will also 
be reduced at the same time. In addition, a less dense population will increase various costs for 
                                                          
1 It must be noted, however, that aggregation is still impossible as is true with other Cobb-Douglas production functions 
unless
L
K is identical. Although S does not affect the relation among Y, K, and L, aggregation demands an additional 
more restrictive constraint on the relation among Y, K, and L such that  212121 , LLKKfYY  , where Yi, Ki, and 
Li indicate Y, K, and L for economy i. Here, it is not the spatial size (S) but the size of Y that matters. 
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firms, including costs for transportation, communication, and other utilities. Therefore, the 
population density will not become too low in the industrial area and will converge on a certain 
optimal value. Convergence to the optimal population density indicates that the size of the 
industrial area in an economy will become optimum in the long run through changes in the 
population size.  
 In this paper, the “long run” means the period during which the population density in an 
industrial area can be seen on average as being optimal and constant. The “short run” means the 
period during which the population density is not yet sufficiently adjusted to reach its optimal 
state after deviating from it. Note that, in the standard view, the “long run” often means the period 
during which capital stocks are being adjusted corresponding to a change in labor inputs. Hence, 
the meanings of the long and short runs are completely different in the standard view and in this 
paper. 
 
3.2  An alternative model for examining immigration 
Instead of HS and LS workers, HI and LI workers are assumed. HI and LI workers are identical 
to each other except for their values of ω: ωHI > ωLI, where ωHI and ωLI are ω of HI and LI workers, 
respectively and they are constant. ω is the same as shown in Section 3.1.1.3 and indicates the 
degree of worker’s innovative intelligence. Hence, HI workers mean the workers with higher 
innovative intelligence and LI workers mean the workers with lower innovative intelligence. Note 
that the reason why workers have different values of ω is beyond the scope of economics and is 
the subject of study in other fields. In this paper, I only examine what will happen to wages and 
incomes when a HI or LI worker immigrates given the number of HI and LI workers already in a 
host country. 
 
3.2.1  The model 
Let LHI and LLI be the numbers of HI and LI workers in a host country, respectively. Let LS be a 
unit of the size of the economy, and initially
LIHIS LLL  . Let also
S
HI
HI
L
L
S  and LIS  
S
LI
L
L
; thus, initially
LIHI
HI
HI
LL
L
S

 and
LIHI
LI
LI
LL
L
S

 . SHI and SLI can be interpreted as the 
sizes of the economies of HI and LI workers within the host country, respectively. σ is assumed 
to be independent of ω and constant, but this assumption is removed in Section 6.2. Capital inputs 
are also assumed to move perfectly elastically. Based on the model of TFP shown in Section 3.1, 
the production function can be described by modifying equation (8) as  
 
    111 LILILIHIHIHIα SLωSLωAKσY ,                 (10) 
 
where α (> 0) is a constant parameter and the same as used in equation (4); that is, α represents 
the experience curve effect. Equation (10) can be interpreted such that the economy of the host 
country is the combined economies of HI and LI workers. A
~
and K
~
are common for both HI and 
LI workers’ economies; therefore, there is no need to change equation (8) because of the size 
difference. L
~
is different, however, between the economies of HI and LI workers because 
workers are heterogeneous. Hence, the L
~
of the economy of HI workers and that of LI workers 
should be adjusted by 1
HIS and
1
LIS , respectively. As a result, equation (8) is modified to 
equation (10). 
 Equation (10) indicates that as LS is smaller, Y is larger. A smaller LS indicates lower 
population density in the industrial area. However, as shown in Section 3.1.2.3, the population 
density will converge at a certain optimal value through competition and arbitration among firms 
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in the long run. Let
SL be a unit of the size of the economy when the population density is optimal 
(thereby
sL is constant). Hence, by equation (10), the production function in the long run is 
described by  
 
 LILIHIHISα LωLωLAKσY   11  ,                   (11) 
 
where the population density is assumed to be optimal initially; thereby, 
LIHIS LLL  , where
HIL and LIL are the initial values of LHI and LLI. 
 Equations (10) and (11) are not standard production functions (i.e., they are not Cobb-
Douglas or CES production functions). Therefore, as will be shown in the following sections, 
they avoid the previously noted problems caused by using the standard production function. Note, 
however, that if workers are not heterogeneous (i.e., if ωωω LIHI  ), then equation (10) 
degenerates to  
 
ααLAKσωY  1 ,                           (12) 
 
which is a Cobb-Douglas production function, and thereby α indicates the labor share. This means 
that, in the alternative production function, the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital 
inputs is still constant, as it is in the Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions, but it is not 
constant between HI and LI workers. 
 
3.2.2  Wages and the real interest rate in the short run 
When LHI or LLI unexpectedly increases, the industrial area will not be able to quickly increase to 
return to its optimal size, and the population density will therefore increase in the short run. This 
means that a unit of the size increases; in this case, the value of LS increases. Hence, equation
LIHIS LLL  holds even after LHI or LLI increases, and SLIHIS LLLL  in the short run.  
 Therefore,  
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Hence, the wages for HI workers (wHI) and LI workers (wLI) are  
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Therefore, if   HILI ωω  1 , 
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but if   HILI ωω  1 ,  
 
1lim
0


LI
HI
L w
w
LI
. 
 
 Here, because 
 
    LI
LIHI
LILIHIHI
L
ωα
LL
LωLω
α
HI
















11lim
0
                (15) 
 
and  
 
      HI
LIHI
LILIHIHI
L
ωα
LL
LωLω
α
HI
















11lim ;               (16) 
 
then, by equations (13), (15), and (16),  
 
0HIw . 
 
In addition, by equations (14), (15), and (16), if SLI is not very small (conversely, SHI is not close 
to unity) or   HILI ωαω  1 , then 
 
 11 
0LIw . 
 
However, if SLI is very small (conversely, SHI is close to unity) and   HILI ωαω  1 ,  
 
0LIw . 
 
That is, if SLI is very small and   HILI ωαω  1 , then not only 1
LI
HI
w
w
 but also 0LIw . 
Conversely, because 0LIw , then 1
LI
HI
w
w
for 0HIw . 
 In sum, when SLI is not very small, then 0 LIHI ww  is always true, and even when 
SLI is very small, if LIω  is not too much lower than HIω  such that   HILI ωω  1 , then 
0 LIHI ww is also true. However, if SLI is very small and if LIω is far lower than HIω such 
that   HILI ωω  1 , then the anomaly LIHI ww  0 will occur. This anomaly disappears in the 
long run (i.e., when the optimal population density returns) as will be shown in Section 3.2.3, but 
it will be a problem in the short run because an LI immigrant cannot enter the labor market of the 
host country under this condition. The outcomes of this case are examined in detail in Sections 4 
and 6. 
 Finally, the real interest rate is  
 
     LILIHIHILIHIα LωLωLLAKσα
K
Y
r 



 11
  
 
and by equation (10), 
 
  11  YKαr .                            (17) 
 
Note that r is kept constant because capital moves perfectly elastically across economies. 
 
3.2.3  Wages and the real interest rate in the long run 
In the long run, 
LIHISS LLLL  holds, and thereby LIHIS LLL  if LHI or LLI changes 
from the initial value, even though
LIHIS LLL  holds in the short run. Thereby, 
0
HI
S
HI
S
dL
Ld
dL
dL
 and 0
LI
S
LI
S
dL
Ld
dL
dL
, and 
 
1

















L
dL
LL
L
d
dL
L
L
d
L
S
HI
LIHI
HI
HI
S
HI
HI
HI , 
0

















LI
LIHI
HI
LI
S
HI
LI
HI
dL
LL
L
d
dL
L
L
d
L
S
, 
0

















HI
LIHI
LI
HI
S
LI
HI
LI
dL
LL
L
d
dL
L
L
d
L
S
, 
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 and  
 
1

















L
dL
LL
L
d
dL
L
L
d
L
S
LI
LIHI
LI
LI
S
LI
LI
LI . 
 
Therefore, wHI and wLI in the long run are  
 
11 


 S
α
HI
HI
HI LAKωσ
L
Y
w                       (18) 
 
and 
 
11 


 S
α
LI
LI
LI LAKωσ
L
Y
w .                      (19) 
 
Hence, the following inequalities are always true: 
 
0HIw , 
 
0LIw , 
 
and 
 
1
LI
HI
LI
HI
ω
ω
w
w
. 
 
That is, the ratio of wHI to wLI is constant and always equal to the ratio of ωHI to ωLI. Thereby, in 
the long run,  
 
0 LIHI ww . 
 
 Note that the actual wages may be neither the short-run or long-run wages, but rather 
some mix of those because the speed of convergence of the population density to its optimal value 
is unclear for firms and workers. 
 The real interest rate in the long run is  
 
   LILIHIHISα LωLωLAKσα
K
Y
r 


  11  ,               (20) 
 
and thereby equation (17) still holds in the long run. In addition, r is also kept constant in the long 
run.  
 
3.3  Incentives for immigration 
As shown in Section 3.1.1.2, σ is influenced not only by physical transportation facilities but 
also by law enforcement, regulation, the financial system, and other related factors. Because 
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efficiencies related to these factors clearly differ among countries, it is highly likely that the value 
ofσ is heterogeneous among countries.  
 Suppose that there are only two countries (Countries 1 and 2), and σ of Country 1 is 
higher than that of Country 2; that is, 
21 σσ  , where iσ is the σ of Country i. Both countries 
are at the long-run steady state, and therefore the size unit is constant. Hence, by equations (18) 
and (19), wages in both countries are  
 
α
HIHI
L
K
Aωσw








1
1
1
11,
, 
α
HIHI
L
K
Aωσw








1
2
2
22,
, 
α
LILI
L
K
Aωσw








1
1
1
11,
, 
 
and 
 
α
LILI
L
K
Aωσw








1
2
2
22,
, 
 
where 
iHIw , , iLIw , , Ki, and Li are HIw , LIw , K, and (LHI + LLI) of Country i, and A, HIω , and
LIω are common between the two countries. Hence,  
 
α
α
LI
LI
HI
HI
L
K
σ
L
K
σ
w
w
w
w















1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2,
1,
2,
1, . 
 
Here, 
21 σσ  and obviously
2
2
1
1
L
K
L
K
 , then 
 
1
2,
1,
2,
1,

LI
LI
HI
HI
w
w
w
w
. 
 
That is, the wages for both HI and LI workers in Country 1 are higher than those in Country 2. 
Therefore, there are economic incentives for both HI and LI workers in Country 2 to immigrate 
to Country 1. 
 
4  IMPACTS OF LI IMMIGRANTS 
 
4.1  Impacts on wages and incomes in the short run 
4.1.1  The usual case 
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The “usual case” is the case when SLI is not very small or when SLI is very small and 
  HILI ωω  1 . As is shown in Section 3.2.2, in this case, 0 LIHI ww . 
 
4.1.1.1  Changes in wages 
By equations (13), (14), and (20), 
 
   



























LIHI
LIHI
LI
α
LIHILI
LIHI
LI
HI ωω
LL
L
LL
K
Aσα
dL
LL
K
d
dL
dw
1       (21) 
 
and 
 
   



























HILI
LIHI
HI
α
LIHILI
LIHI
LI
LI ωω
LL
L
LL
K
Aσα
dL
LL
K
d
dL
dw
1 .     (22) 
 
 Here, by total differential of equation (20) under the condition that dLHI = 0,  
 
  
α
K
LL
α
ω
dL
dK
LIHI
LI
LI









1
.                      (23) 
 
By equation (23), 
 
    21
1 















LIHILIHI
LIHI
LI
LI
LIHI
LLLL
α
K
LL
ω
dL
LL
K
d
.       (24) 
 
Therefore, if 
LIHI LL  is sufficiently large, 0
1



LIHI
LI
LL
ω and   02  LIHI LL ; thereby, 
by equation (24), 0







LI
LIHI
dL
LL
K
d
.  
 
 Because
LIHI ωω  , by equations (21) and (22), if LIHI LL  is sufficiently large, then  
 
0
LI
HI
dL
dw
 
 
and 
 
 0
LI
LI
dL
dw
. 
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That is, LI immigrants usually increase the wage for HI workers and decrease the wage for LI 
workers in the short run. Particularly, if LHI = LLI, then 0
LI
LI
LI
HI
dL
dw
dL
dw
by equations (21) and 
(22). That is, the average wage of HI and LI workers is unchanged because there are both positive 
and negative effects of an increase in LI workers on wHI and wLI, and the magnitudes of the two 
opposing effects are different between wHI and wLI. Due to an increase in LI workers, K increases 
to keep r constant. The increase in K increases both wHI and wLI. On the other hand, the theory 
behind the model of TFP shown in Section 3.1 (also see the Appendix) indicates that an increase 
in the number of workers advances the degree of division of labor, but this advance increases 
inefficiency due to fragmentation of information. The positive effect of the increase in K on wHI 
exceeds the negative effect of the increase in inefficiency on wHI and thereby 0
LI
HI
dL
dw
, but the 
positive effect on wLI cannot exceed the negative effect on wLI and thereby 0
LI
LI
dL
dw
. 
 
4.1.1.2  Increase in the national income of natives 
The national income of natives (YD) when LI immigrants arrive is 
 
LIMLILIMD LwYYYY ,,   
 
where YM,LI is the sum of LI immigrants’ incomes and LM,LI is the number of LI immigrants. Here, 
LILIM dL
dY
dL
dY

,
, and it is assumed that initially 0, LIML . Hence,  
 
LI
LI
LIM
LIM
LI
LI
LIMLIM
D w
dL
dY
L
dL
dw
w
dL
dY
dL
dY
 ,
,,,
.              (25) 
 
By total differential of equation (10) under the condition that dLHI = 0, 
 
LI
LILI
w
dL
dK
r
dL
dY
 ,                          (26) 
 
and by total differential of equation (17) under the condition that dLHI = 0,  
 
LILI dL
dK
α
r
dL
dY


1
.                           (27) 
 
By equations (26) and (27),  
 
α
w
dL
dY LI
LI
 .                             (28) 
 
Therefore, by equations (25) and (28), 
 
0
1





 
 LI
M,LI
D w
α
α
dL
dY
.                        (29) 
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That is, an immigration of LI workers increases the national income of natives in the usual case. 
Equation (29) indicates that, unlike in the standard view, the national income of natives increases 
regardless of SHI and SLI. 
 
4.1.2  Exceptional case 
The “exceptional case” is the case when SLI is very small and at the same time   HILI ωω  1 . 
As Section 3.2.2 shows, in this case, 
LIHI ww  0 . 
 
4.1.2.1  Changes in wages 
Because
LIw0 , it is impossible for an LI immigrant to enter the labor market of the host country 
in the short run. This means that LI immigrants have to be fully supported financially by native 
residents in the short run. 
 More generally, suppose that there are N workers in the host country and ωi is the ω of 
worker i (= 1, 2, 3, …, N). In addition, if i < j, then ωi < ωj. Therefore, the wage for worker i (wi) 
is 
 
  





 


N
i
ii
αα
i ωNαωNAKσw
1
111 1 .                  (30) 
 
Letω~ be the average ω in the host country; that is, 


N
i
iωNω
1
1~ . Equation (30) therefore 
indicates that if  
 
 ωαωi
~1 , 
 
worker i cannot enter the labor market in the short run. As shown in Section 3.2.1, α means the 
labor share, and it is well known that the labor share is about 0.7 in many countries. Hence, if an 
immigrant’s ω is less than 30% ofω~ , the immigrant likely will need financial support in the short 
run. Note that in the long run, such an immigrant can enter the labor market. 
 The reason for
LIw0 is that an increase in the number of workers increases not only 
output but also inefficiency caused by fragmentation of information (see the Appendix). If the ω 
of a worker who newly enters the network of division of labor is too low, the negative effect on 
wLI (i.e., the increase in inefficiency due to increased fragmentation of information) exceeds the 
positive effect on it (i.e., the increase in outputs), and thereby   0


LI
LI
w
L
Y
.  
 An important point is that, unlike the standard view, no HI worker will want to work as 
an LI worker in the exceptional case because
LIHI ww  0 . 
 
4.1.2.2  Increase in the national income of natives 
Suppose again that initially 0, LIML . Because immigrants do not enter the labor market and 
receive financial aid from the host country, then 
 
0
,

LIMdL
dY
. 
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Suppose that each immigrant receives financial aid of βwLI (0 < β < 1) from the host country. 
Hence,  
 
0,
,,,
 LILIM
LIM
LI
LI
LIMLIM
D βwL
dL
dw
βw
dL
dY
dL
dY
. 
 
In the exceptional case, an LI immigrant decreases the national income of natives by
LIMLI Lβw ,
in the short run. 
 
4.2  Impacts on wages and incomes in the long run 
4.2.1  Changes in wages 
By equations (18) and (19), in the long run, 
 
 
LI
S
α
HI
LI
HI
dL
dK
LAKωσα
dL
dw 11                       (31) 
 
and 
 
 
LI
S
α
LI
LI
LI
dL
dK
LAKωσα
dL
dw 11   .                    (32) 
 
By total differential of equation (17) under the condition that dLHI = 0,  
 
01 

  Kα
LωLω
ω
dL
dK
LILIHIHI
LI
LI
.                    (33) 
 
Hence, by equations (31) and (32) and inequality (33),  
 
0
LI
HI
dL
dw
 
 
and 
 
0
LI
LI
dL
dw
. 
 
That is, the immigration of LI workers increases wages for both HI and LI workers in the long 
run. This result is natural because
LI
HI
LI
HI
ω
ω
w
w
 is kept in the long run as shown in Section 3.2.3. 
 
4.2.2  Increase in the national income of natives 
Equations (25), (26), (27), and (28) still hold in the long run. Thereby, inequality (29) also holds. 
In the long run, therefore, the immigration of LI workers increases the national income of natives. 
Moreover, unlike in the standard view, this increase is irrelevant to SHI and SLI. 
 
5  IMPACTS OF HI IMMIGRANTS 
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5.1  Impacts on wages and incomes in the short run 
5.1.1  Changes in wages 
By equations (13), (14), and (20), 
 
   



























LIHI
LIHI
LI
α
LIHIHI
LIHI
HI
HI ωω
LL
L
LL
K
Aσα
dL
LL
K
d
dL
dw
1       (34) 
 
and 
 
   



























HILI
LIHI
HI
α
LIHIHI
LIHI
HI
LI ωω
LL
L
LL
K
Aσα
dL
LL
K
d
dL
dw
1 .     (35) 
 
 Here, by total differential of equation (20) under the condition that dLLI = 0,  
 
Kα
LL
α
ω
dL
dK
LIHI
HI
HI
11 








 .                     (36) 
 
By equation (36), 
 
  













 
LIHI
HILIHI
HI
LIHI
LL
ωαLLK
dL
LL
K
d
111 . 
 
Therefore, if
LIHI
HI
LL
ω


1
, then 0







HI
LIHI
dL
LL
K
d
. In other words, if
LIHI LL  is sufficiently 
large, 0







HI
LIHI
dL
LL
K
d
. 
 Because
LIHI ωω  , if LIHI LL  is sufficiently large, then by equations (34) and (35), 
 
0
HI
HI
dL
dw
 
 
and 
 
 0
HI
LI
dL
dw
. 
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That is, the immigration of HI workers increases the wage for HI workers and decreases the wage 
for LI workers in the short run. 
 
5.1.2  Increase in the national income of natives 
The national income of natives (YD) when HI workers immigrate is  
 
HIMHIHIMD LwYYYY ,,  , 
 
where YM,HI is the sum of HI immigrants’ incomes and LM,HI is the number of HI immigrants. Here, 
HIHIM dL
dY
dL
dY

,
, and it is assumed that initially 0, HIML . Hence,  
 
HI
HI
HIM
HIM
HI
HI
HIMHIM
D w
dL
dY
L
dL
dw
w
dL
dY
dL
dY
 ,
,,,
.             (37) 
 
By total differential of equation (10) under the condition that dLLI = 0, 
 
HI
HIHI
w
dL
dK
r
dL
dY
 ,                          (38) 
 
and by total differential of equation (17) under the condition that dLLI = 0,  
 
HIHI dL
dK
α
r
dL
dY


1
.                           (39) 
 
By equations (38) and (39),  
 
α
w
dL
dY HI
HI
 .                             (40) 
 
Therefore, by equations (37) and (40), 
 
0
1
,





 
 HI
HIM
D w
α
α
dL
dY
.                       (41) 
 
That is, the immigration of HI workers increases the national income of natives in the short run. 
In addition, unlike in the standard view, this increase is irrelevant to SHI and SLI. 
 
5.2  Impacts on wages and incomes in the long run 
5.2.1  Changes in wages 
In the long run, by equations (18) and (19),  
 
 
LI
S
α
HI
LI
HI
dL
dK
LAKωσα
dL
dw 11                       (42) 
 
and 
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 
LI
S
α
LI
LI
LI
dL
dK
LAKωσα
dL
dw 11   .                    (43) 
 
By total differential of equation (17) under the condition that dLHI = 0,  
 
01 

  Kα
LωLω
ω
dL
dK
LILIHIHI
HI
HI
.                    (44) 
 
Hence, by equations (42) and (43) and inequality (44),  
 
0
HI
HI
dL
dw
 
 
and 
 
0
HI
LI
dL
dw
. 
 
That is, the immigration of HI workers increases wages for both HI and LI workers in the long 
run.  
 
5.2.2  Increase in the national income of natives 
Equations (37), (38), (39), and (40) still hold in this case. Inequality (41) therefore also holds. The 
immigration of HI workers increases the national income of natives in the long run as well as in 
the short run. Moreover, unlike in the standard view, this feature is irrelevant to SHI and SLI. 
 
6  DETERRENT FACTORS 
 
Equation (12) and the examinations in Sections 3 and 4 indicate that there are several important 
factors that work against taking an open door policy. For example, there are circumstances in 
which LI immigrants reduce the national income of natives. In addition, even if the national 
income of natives is not reduced, some natives may suffer other significant damages, for example, 
widening inequality in wages. If we take these deterrent factors into consideration, the 
immigration policy puzzle described by Giordani and Ruta (2011) is no longer a puzzle. 
 
6.1  The exceptional case 
In the exceptional case (i.e., SLI is very small and   HILI ωω  1 , or more generally 
 ωαωi
~1 ), LIHI ww  0 and LI immigrants cannot enter the labor market in the short run. 
They need financial support (financial aid of
LIMLI Lβw , ) from the natives (i.e., the government of 
the host country). However, the burden the natives have to bear is not limited to the transfer of
LIMLI Lβw , to LI immigrants because the negative wage ( LIw0 ) may matter not only to LI 
immigrants but also to native LI workers. If the long-run wage determined by equation (19) is 
applied to native LI workers, the wage for the native LI workers will be kept the same as before 
the arrival of LI immigrants. If the wage for native LI workers changes in the short run according 
to equation (14), however, it will also become negative, similar to that for LI immigrants. Even if 
the long-run wage may be applied to native LI workers, it is likely that the negative wage for LI 
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immigrants will put huge downward pressure on the wage for native LI workers. As a result, it 
seems likely that the wage for the native LI workers will be reduced to some extent if LI 
immigrants arrive. Although the national income of natives may not be reduced according to the 
reduction in the wage for native LI workers, a portion of the national income will be transferred 
from native LI workers to native HI workers and capital owners, and inequality in incomes among 
the native population will increase. The increase in inequality may be interpreted as another kind 
of burden that the natives have to bear. If there is a public welfare system such that low-income 
households receive financial aid from the government, the increase in inequality will further 
increase the fiscal burden of the government.  
 In sum, in the exceptional case, the national income of natives will decrease, the wage 
for the native LI workers will decrease, inequality will increase, and the fiscal burden of the 
government will increase. Hence, if the exceptional case is actualized, it seems likely that a 
country would strictly limit LI immigrants. 
 
6.2  Endogenous σ  
6.2.1  σ  as a function of the ratio of LHI to LLI 
As discussed in Section 3, the value of σ is likely heterogeneous among countries. In addition, 
it is likely that if people have higher innovative intelligences, more efficient financial and other 
institutions will be established. Therefore, if the ratio of HI to LI workers in a country is higher, 
the country’s σ will be higher. Taking this relationship betweenσ and innovative intelligences 
into consideration, it seems likely thatσ is a function such that  
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 If σ is an endogenous variable as indicated by equation (45),  
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where
HIw and LIw are, respectively, wHI and wLI whenσ is constant and independent of R. Because 
0
HIdL
σd
and 0
LIdL
σd
, wHI is larger than HIw and wLI is smaller than LIw .  
 
6.2.2  Impacts of LI immigrants 
By total differential of equation (20), 
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By total differential of equation (10), 
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By equations (48) and (49),  
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Therefore, by equation (50), if 
LI
LI
w
dL
σd
σ
Y
 , then  
 
0
LIdL
dY
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That is, if 
LIdL
σd
takes a sufficiently large negative value, LI immigrants make Y decrease. This 
result holds both in the short and long runs. Therefore, it is possible for the national income of 
natives to decrease through LI worker immigration even in the long run. This result indicates that 
an endogenousσ will work as an important deterrent against a country accepting LI immigrants. 
 As shown in Section 3.3, Country 1 is more productive than Country 2 because of its 
higherσ . Accepting LI immigrant workers makes Country 1 less productive. This means that 
Country 1 changes to become relatively closer to Country 2 in terms of production.  
 
6.2.3  Impacts of HI immigrants 
By total differential of equation (20), 
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By equations (17) and (51), 
 





 


α
α
r
dL
σd
σ
Y
w
dL
dK HI
HI
HI
1
.                     (52) 
 
By total differential of equation (10), 
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By equations (52) and (53),  
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Because 0
HIdL
σd
, then by equation (54),  
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That is, if HI immigrants arrive, Y always increases. This result holds both in the short and long 
runs. Because 0 HI
HIM,HI
D w
dL
dY
dL
dY
even when σ is constant, HI immigrants further 
increase the national income of natives in the case of an endogenous σ . Hence, unlike LI 
immigrants, HI immigrants will be generally welcomed in many countries. 
 
6.3  Expandability of the industrial area 
In this paper, I have assumed that the industrial area can be expanded at no cost, although the 
expansion may take time. In actuality, expanding the industrial area will incur some costs. In 
addition, the costs will differ among economies, particularly depending on the scarcity of land 
where economic activities can be sufficiently concentrated. The costs for expansion will be higher 
in a country where appropriate land is scarcer. For example, the costs will be higher in a small 
country with a high population density than they will be in a large country with a low population 
density.  
 If there are large differences in the costs of expanding the industrial area among 
economies, the lengths of the short and long runs will differ among them. In a small country with 
a very high population density, the short run may be very long because of the very high costs to 
expand its industrial area. Similarly, the length may be shorter in a large country. Therefore, in a 
small country with a very high population density, the short-run effects of immigrants may persist 
for a very long period. Because LI immigrants will place significant downward pressures on 
wages for native LI workers in the “short” run, the significant downward pressures will prolong 
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for a very “long” period. Therefore, this expandability factor may work as a very important 
deterrent against immigration in small and densely populated countries. Conversely, people in 
large countries with lower population densities may be more open to LI immigrants. 
 
6.4  Impact on the rate of time preference 
Many empirical studies indicate that the rate of time preference (RTP) is negatively correlated 
with income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003). Therefore, it is likely that 
the RTP of the representative household (RTP RH) is negatively correlated with R (see Harashima, 
2012). Let θ be RTP RH, and θ is a function of R such that   
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and 
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An increase in θ decreases output, consumption, and capital at equilibrium because, as is well 
known, θ = r at equilibrium. Inequality (56) therefore indicates that LI immigrants will result in 
lower levels of output, consumption, and capital in the long run by raising θ. This factor may also 
work as an important deterrent against LI immigrants.  
 On the other hand, inequality (55) indicates that HI immigrants will result in higher 
levels of output, consumption, and capital, and thereby HI immigrants will be generally welcomed 
in many countries, similar to the case of endogenousσ .  
 
7  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The standard view on the economic impact of immigration is that immigration has positive 
economic effects as a whole, although it has some negative effects on wages for low-skilled 
workers. However, Giordani and Ruta (2011) argued that the standard view has an important 
problem (the “immigration policy puzzle”). In addition, the standard production function has 
another problem when it is used to examine immigration because skills are indifferent to net 
income. An alternative framework for examining immigration that does not rely on the standard 
production function is needed. 
 I present an alternative production function that will be more useful when workers are 
heterogeneous. It is constructed based on the model of TFP presented in Harashima (2009, 2011, 
2012). The alternative framework based on this production function shows that there is no 
guarantee that immigration surpluses are positive if immigrants are less productive workers and 
there are several important deterrent factors against accepting less productive immigrants. These 
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results indicate that an “open door” policy is not necessarily economically optimal for all host 
countries. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A1  Workers’ innovations 
A1.1  Non-accumulative innovation 
A1.1.1  Innovations need not be intrinsically accumulative  
Innovations are usually considered to be intrinsically accumulative, and TFP reflects the total sum 
of innovations that have been created and accumulated in the long history of human beings. 
However, accumulativeness is not a necessary condition for innovation because, as discussed in 
the introduction, its core meaning is the act of introducing something new or the thing itself that 
has been newly introduced. Luecke and Katz (2003) argue that innovation is generally understood 
as the introduction of a new thing or method and the embodiment, combination, or synthesis of 
knowledge in original, relevant, valued new products, processes, or services. The essence of 
innovation is therefore not accumulativeness but newness.  
     Nevertheless, non-accumulative innovations have drawn little or no attention in economics 
because innovations that are not accumulated have been regarded as being without value from an 
economic point of view. Accumulated innovations are often thought of as knowledge or 
technology, and they are usually regarded as equivalent to TFP. An innovation that is not 
accumulated is not included as knowledge, technology, or TFP because these must be commonly 
accessible and non-accumulative innovations are not. From this perspective, non-accumulated 
innovations are considered to have no effect on production and therefore be meaningless. The 
neglect of non-accumulative innovation may also be partially attributed to the belief that 
innovations must be accumulated because they have the innate nature of spillover (i.e., transfer), 
which implies accumulation. If an innovation makes someone better off, rational people have 
incentive to obtain and utilize it; thus, the innovation spills over. To spill over, the innovation 
must be recorded and transferrable in advance, that is, accumulated as a common piece of 
knowledge or technology. Conversely, innovations must be accumulated if they are consistent 
with the incentives of rational people.  
     However, the above rationales do not necessarily hold, for the following reason. A non-
accumulative innovation is without value to people who did not create it, and the above rationales 
are convincing if only those people are considered. There is, however, no a priori reason that a 
non-accumulative innovation is valueless to the person who created it because that person can 
utilize it personally for production even if others cannot. Therefore, even if an innovation is not 
accumulated and does not become common knowledge, it still can contribute to production. A 
non-accumulative innovation may even be an important production element for the person who 
created it. In addition, if the costs to acquire an innovation created by other persons are higher 
than its benefits, the innovation will not spill over. Therefore, the concept that some innovations 
do not spill over and are not accumulated is not inconsistent with rational people’s incentives for 
using innovations. Clearly the accumulativeness of innovation is not a simple issue and requires 
more careful consideration.  
 
A1.1.2  Innovations that are not accumulated 
Innovations will be used personally even if they are not recognized and recorded. In addition, 
some innovations may be deliberately kept personal. Hence, an innovation will not be 
accumulated if nobody is aware of the innovation’s novelty, nobody records or reports the 
innovation, or the person who created the innovation keeps it secret. The above conditions will 
be satisfied in the following situations. An innovation will not be recognized or recorded if the 
innovation is minor or if the innovation can be applied only to an unrepeatable incident. In 
addition, an incentive to keep an innovation secret will be strong if the person who creates the 
innovation cannot gain enough benefits by making it public. Thus an innovation will not be 
recorded if the costs of making the innovation public are higher than its expected benefits.  
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A1.1.2.1  Minor innovations 
A person who creates an innovation may be unaware of having created it if its contribution to 
improving productivity is minor. The person may also notice the increased productivity but not 
seek to identify the reason for the improvement because such an investigation may seem too costly. 
Finally, even if the mechanism of the innovation is noticed and specified, the person who created 
it may not record it if it is deemed to be minor. It is therefore clearly possible that minor 
innovations are not noticed, identified, or recorded.  
     Even if an innovation is unnoticed or unrecorded, it still can be used for production by the 
person who created it, whether consciously or unconsciously, while the person continues doing 
that job. Unnoticed innovations will vanish when that person quits doing the job. If innovations 
are recognized but unrecorded, it is possible that at least some of them could be handed down to 
other workers. Because these are isolated and “personal” occurrences within a small closed group, 
they would not constitute a piece of accumulated knowledge common to all human beings.  
 
A1.1.2.2  Innovations for unrepeatable incidents 
Even if an innovation is not minor, it will not be recorded if it can be applied only to an 
unrepeatable situation. For example, a negotiation between a seller and a buyer will be basically 
unrepeatable. Similar negotiations may occur, but an identical one will not. There are also 
incidents that occur, for example, only on a specific machine installed at a particular location; 
these incidents are never reproduced at other machines installed at other locations. This type of 
isolated and non-reproducible incident can be interpreted as unrepeatable in a broad sense. In 
addition to these spatially unrepeatable incidents, each machine has unique characteristics even if 
it was designed to be exactly the same as other machines. There will not be sufficient incentive 
to record or widely disseminate an innovation that can be applied only to an unrepeatable situation 
or to a machine with unique characteristics. 
  
A1.1.2.3  Costs of disseminating and acquiring information 
There will be a strong incentive to keep an innovation secret if the innovation spills over freely 
without compensation to the innovator. However, even if a patent could be taken out to obtain 
appropriate compensation, the incentive to keep the innovation secret will still be strong if the 
cost of dissemination exceeds expected revenues. If an innovation was created for a minor 
incident, benefits gained from the innovation will usually be smaller than the cost of dissemination, 
and the incentive to keep the innovation personal will be strong. The costs for making an 
innovation public can be classified into two types: dissemination costs and acquisition costs. 
Dissemination costs are the costs paid to make an innovation public and to disseminate it, for 
example, patent application fees, advertising costs, marketing costs, and similar expenditures. 
Acquisition costs are the costs paid to acquire and utilize an innovation that some other person 
created, for example, search costs, transportation costs, and training costs. Patent royalties are 
included in acquisition costs only if the market value of the innovation exceeds the royalty plus 
other acquisition costs. Generally, dissemination costs are likely to be larger than acquisition costs, 
excluding patent royalties. 
     Let δ indicate dissemination costs, η indicate acquisition costs, and π indicate the market 
value of an innovation. As argued above, in general ηδ  if πδ  ; therefore innovations are 
categorized into the following three ranges depending on the relative value of π compared with 
those of δ and η: 
 
  Range I: δηπ  or ηδπ  ; patented accumulative innovations 
  Range II: ηπδ  ; uncompensated spillovers of accumulative innovations 
  Range III: πηδ  ; non-accumulative innovations  
 
 28 
If the market value of an innovation exceeds its dissemination and acquisition costs, the patent of 
the innovation will be sold and disseminated widely (Range I). If the market value of an 
innovation does not exceed its dissemination costs but exceeds its acquisition costs, the innovation 
will disseminate widely without compensation (i.e., uncompensated spillover; Range II). If the 
market value of an innovation does not exceed either cost, the innovation will not be disseminated 
and will be kept personal (i.e., non-accumulative innovation; Range III). Because it is highly 
likely that the number of minor innovations is far larger than the number of innovations that have 
high market values, the shape of innovation distribution slopes downward and to the right, and 
the distribution will have a long tail. This shape can be approximated simply by an exponential 
or Pareto distribution, but it is not necessary to assume a specific functional form of distribution. 
The important point is not the specific functional form of the distribution but its properties—if 
πηδ  , then non-accumulative innovations exist and there will be far more of them than of 
accumulative innovations.  
 
A1.2  The origin of non-accumulative innovation 
It seems clear that non-accumulative innovations exist, but who creates them? Researchers can 
certainly create them, but so can ordinary workers. Usually, workers are implicitly assumed to do 
only what they are ordered to do and nothing else. Workers in this sense can be substituted for 
capital. If the cost of using capital is lower than that of using workers, capital inputs will be chosen 
rather than labor inputs. Generally, such robot-like workers have been assumed as the labor input 
in typical production functions. Of course, workers are not robots. They are human beings that 
are fundamentally different from machines—only humans can fix unexpected problems by 
creating innovations.  
 
A1.2.1  Unexpected problems require innovation 
Actions taken to deal with expected incidents are determined by calculating the solutions to 
optimization problems that are built based on models constructed in advance. These calculations 
can be implemented by machines given a specific objective function, structural equations, 
parameter values, and necessary environmental information. However, this is not true if actions 
taken to deal with unexpected problems are required, because the models constructed in advance 
are guaranteed to be useful only for expected incidents, and they are not necessarily guaranteed 
to be applicable to unexpected incidents. When an unexpected problem occurs, workers in charge 
of the production first have to grasp the situation and then prioritize their actions. During these 
actions, the workers conduct two types of important intellectual activities: (1) discover unknown 
mechanisms that prevail in the surrounding environment and (2) invent new ways to manage the 
environment. That the problem is unexpected indicates that correct mechanisms for this particular 
situation are not known and need to be discovered, and on the basis of the newly discovered 
mechanisms, the structural equations and parameters in the model used for the plan of action 
should be revised. The revised model may indicate that there is no solution to resume efficient 
production, and new ways of managing the environment should be invented. Discovery and 
invention commonly involve the creation of something new, that is, innovation. 
     Machines deal with programmed tasks quite well, often much better than human beings. 
Conversely, machines cannot deal with non-programmed tasks. The performance of machines 
declines and often they stop working if unexpected problems occur because the machines do not 
have a program to deal with unexpected problems. When encountering unexpected problems, 
machines will immediately reach a dead end. They cannot solve unexpected problems by simply 
applying their pre-programmed optimization algorithms, and they cannot rewrite these algorithms 
to make them applicable to unexpected incidents. The revision or creation of models in the face 
of unexpected incidents can be implemented only by human beings.  
 
A1.2.2  Workers’ innovations to fix unexpected minor problems 
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Is it either necessary or expected to utilize workers’ innovations for production? If workers are 
assumed to be robot-like beings, their abilities to solve unexpected problems will not be 
considered as part of production. However, it would be irrational for firms not to utilize workers’ 
innovative abilities if the firms know that workers possess these abilities. An ordinary worker’s 
ability to solve unexpected problems may be lower than that of educated and trained researchers, 
but the abilities of the former should be utilized fully for a firm to be rational. If anything, the 
workers’ abilities to fix unexpected problems appear indispensable in production processes 
because many minor but unforeseeable incidents actually occur. It would be quite inefficient if a 
team of specialized highly educated and trained employees dealt with all unexpected incidents, 
no matter how minor, and workers had to wait for the team to arrive at the locations where a minor 
unexpected incident happened. If, however, an unexpected but minor problem is fixed by a worker 
at the location where the problem occurred, production can proceed more efficiently and smoothly. 
The well-known “Kaizen” method in Japanese manufacturing companies may be a way to more 
completely exploit such opportunities (e.g., Lee et al., 1999). Besides innovations by suppliers, 
“user innovation” by consumers and end users has drawn attention recently (e.g., Baldwin et al., 
2006). It is quite reasonable and rational for firms to fully exploit any opportunity to improve 
productivity whether its source is an innovation created by a researcher, ordinary worker, or user. 
     Finally, a worker’s ability to fix unexpected problems may seem to be part of the set of the 
worker’s learned skills or techniques, but that ability is fundamentally different from learned skills 
or techniques because learning skills and techniques and creating skills and techniques are 
completely different activities.    
 
A1.3  Imperfections make workers’ innovations indispensable 
Although it is rational for employers to fully exploit workers’ innovations, in this section, I 
explain why workers’ innovations are truly an indispensable element in production. 
 
A1.3.1  Imperfect accumulated innovations 
The current state of accumulated innovations is far from perfect, and, moreover, it always will be. 
Human beings will never know everything about the universe. Although we may be able to fully 
utilize known information, we still face many unexpected problems because the knowledge and 
technology we currently possess is imperfect. If accumulated innovations were perfect, machines 
that embody them would always work well in any situation. However, the accumulated 
innovations are not perfect, and thus machines malfunction occasionally or face other unexpected 
incidents. As stated previously, it is very efficient if workers’ innovations are utilized to fix these 
minor but unexpected troubles. Imperfection of accumulated innovations therefore necessitates 
workers’ innovations. 
 
A1.3.2  Incomplete information caused by the division of labor 
Labor input has the property of diminishing marginal product, which is usually explained by 
congestion or redundancy. However, this explanation is not necessarily convincing. The 
inefficiency caused by congestion or redundancy can be removed by division of labor. If labor is 
sufficiently divided, there will be no congestion or redundancy, and the labor input will not exhibit 
diminishing marginal product. This suggests that division of labor cannot remove all 
inefficiencies with regard to labor input. With division of labor, each worker experiences only a 
fraction of the whole production process. These divided and isolated workers can access only a 
fraction of information on the whole production process. It is also difficult for a worker to know 
information that many other workers at different production sites accessed. Because all of the 
labor inputs are correlated owing to division of labor, this feature of fragmented information is 
especially problematic when workers engage in intellectual activities. Correlation of the entire 
labor input indicates that all pieces of information on the whole production process need to be 
completely known to each worker to enable correct decision making. However, only a portion of 
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the information on the whole production process is available to each worker; that is, each 
individual worker has incomplete information. When an unexpected problem occurs, workers 
with fragmented and incomplete information will make different, usually worse, decisions than 
those with complete information. As a result, overall productivity decreases. 
     For example, a CEO of a large company may know the overall plan of production but not 
the local and minor individual incidents that happen at each production site each day. In contrast, 
each worker at each production site may know little of the overall plan but a great deal about local 
and minor individual incidents that occur for each specific task each worker engages in at each 
production site. To be most efficient, even if many unexpected incidents happen, all of the 
workers and the CEO need to know all of the information on the entire process because all of the 
labor inputs are correlated owing to division of labor. However, it is nearly impossible for each 
worker to access all of the experiences of every other worker. Division of labor therefore leads to 
information fragmentation and obstructs any person from knowing all the information about the 
entire production process. 
     Each worker therefore must use incomplete information when encountering unexpected 
problems. Conjecturing the full detailed structure of the whole production process is an 
intellectual activity to discover unknown mechanisms. If a worker can discover more correct 
mechanisms even in the absence of complete information, the inefficiency is mitigated. However, 
completely mitigating the inefficiency will be impossible, and decisions based on less information 
will deviate from those made with full information. Sometimes actions that are relatively less 
urgent or important will be given priority, and efficiency will decline. As the division of labor 
increases, workers are less able to correctly estimate the full structure of the whole production 
process and less able to correctly prioritize actions to solve unexpected problems.  
     Division of labor cannot simultaneously solve inefficiency caused by congestion or 
redundancy and that caused by fragmented and incomplete information. Although a greater 
division of labor removes the former, it generates the latter. Inefficiency resulting from congestion 
and redundancy is probably much more serious than that caused by information fragmentation, 
and labor is divided almost completely despite the fact that information fragmentation harms 
productivity.  
 
A1.3.3  Indispensable and economically important workers’ innovation 
Even if workers can innovate to fix unexpected minor troubles, the question remains whether 
these innovations are important economically. In general, most non-accumulative innovations are 
minor, which suggests that they may not be economically important. However, as discussed in 
Section A1.1, there will be far more minor innovations than major innovations. There are also 
usually far more ordinary workers than researchers and other highly trained or educated 
employees. In addition, the distributions of innovations for researchers and other highly trained 
employees and for ordinary workers are certainly different. Ordinary workers are likely to have a 
limited contribution to accumulative innovations (i.e., Ranges I and II) as compared to that of 
researchers and other highly trained employees, but the former will have a much larger 
contribution to non-accumulative innovations (Range III). As previously discussed, non-
accumulative innovations are indispensable for production at each production site because of 
imperfect accumulative innovations and fragmented and incomplete information. Without 
worker-created non-accumulative innovations, the efficiency of production will decline 
considerably. This indispensability indicates that workers’ innovations are economically 
important. The economic importance of workers’ innovations is further examined in Section A3. 
 
A2  The experience curve effect 
A2.1  The experience curve effect and workers’ innovations 
Workers’ innovations are indispensable, but how are they created? The experience curve effect 
gives a clue to this mechanism. 
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A2.1.1  The theory of the experience curve effect 
The experience curve effect states that the more often a task is performed, the lower the cost of 
doing it. Workers who perform repetitive tasks exhibit an improvement in performance as the task 
is repeated a number of times. The primary idea of the experience curve effect (the “learning 
curve effect” in earlier literature) dates back to Wright (1936), Hirsch (1952), Alchian (1963), 
and Rapping (1965). The experience (or learning) curve effect has been applied in many fields, 
including business management, strategy, and organization studies.  
     The experience curve effect is usually expressed by the following functional form: 
 
)1(
1
α
N NCC
                              (A1) 
 
where
1C is the cost of the first unit of output of a task, NC is the cost of the Nth unit of output, N 
is the cumulative volume of output and interpreted as experience of a worker engaging in the task, 
and α is a constant parameter ( 10  α ). 
N
N
C
C2 and α1  are often called the progress ratio and 
learning rate, respectively. This log-linear functional form is most commonly used probably 
because of its simplicity and good fit to data. Empirical studies have shown that α is usually 
between 0.6 and 0.9. Studies by Boston Consulting Group (BCG) in the 1970s showed that 
experience curve effects for various industries range from 10 to 25% cost reductions for every 
doubling of output (i.e., 85.058.0  α ) (e.g., BCG, 1972). Dutton and Thomas (1984) present 
the distribution of progress ratios obtained from a sample of 108 manufacturing firms. The ratios 
mostly range from 0.7 to 0.9 (i.e., 85.048.0  α ) and average 0.82 (i.e., 71.0α ). 
OECD/IEA (2000) argues that industry-level progress ratios have a similar distribution as the 
firm-level ones shown in Dutton and Thomas (1984; see also, e.g., Hirsch, 1956; Womer and 
Patterson, 1983; Womer, 1984; Ayres and Martinas, 1992; Williams and Terzian, 1993). 
     The magnitude of α (or equivalently the progress ratio or learning rate) may be affected by 
various factors (e.g., Hirsch, 1956; Adler and Clark, 1991; Pisano et al., 2001; Argote et al., 2003; 
Sorenson, 2003; Wiersma, 2007). Nevertheless, the average α is usually observed to be almost 
0.7 (i.e., a progress ratio of 0.8 and a learning rate of 0.3) as shown in BCG (1972), Dutton and 
Thomas (1984), and OECD/IEA (2000). It therefore seems reasonable to assume that α is 0.7 on 
average.  
 
A2.1.2  Information conveyed by experience 
An important element that an experience conveys is information. By accumulating experiences 
of doing a task, a worker increases the amount of information known about the task and makes it 
more complete. In this sense, N, which indicates experience in equation (A1), reflects the current 
amount of information a worker possesses about a task. Accumulated experiences will improve 
efficiency in implementing a task because the amount of information on the task increases. 
However, if other factors remain the same, the magnitude of improvement will diminish as N 
accumulates because the information on the task will approach saturation. 
     Let I be a set of the currently available maximum information on a task. Engaging in the 
task in a unit of period provides a subset of I to a worker. Engaging in more units of period (i.e., 
accumulating experience N) makes the information on the task the worker currently possesses 
( I
~
) approach I (i.e., the difference between I
~
and I diminishes). A part of the subset of I the 
worker acquires in a unit of period will overlap the part of the subset of I the worker acquires in 
the next period. With more complete information, accordingly, efficiency will improve. Because 
I
~
→ I as N → ∞, then the magnitude of improvement will asymptotically decrease as N increases. 
Nevertheless, this asymptotical decrease may not be a simple process. Some piece of information 
may be easily obtainable and some other piece may not be, and some portion of information may 
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have a relatively large impact on efficiency and other portions have small effects. The functional 
form that describes the asymptotical decrease of the magnitude of improvement will depend on 
interaction between these effects. The log-linear functional form )1(
1
α
N NCC
  fits empirical 
data well and is simple, and thus it has been used mostly for the experience curve effect.  
 
A2.1.3  Extending the concept of the experience curve effect  
Because the essence of experience is that it conveys information, the experience curve effect can 
be extended to a wide variety of tasks. The tasks need not be limited to a worker’s repeated actions, 
that is, tasks whose experiences are divided by periods. For example, consider that a human 
activity can be divided into many experiences, each of which is obtained by different workers. 
Each experience conveys a subset of information, and a part of the subset overlaps with subsets 
regarding other experiences. The experience curve effect will be applicable to this kind of task by 
interpreting N as a subset of all worker experiences, so a task in a period whose experiences are 
divided by workers will be also applicable to the experience curve effect in the same way that a 
task performed by a worker whose experiences are divided by periods is. Extending this logic 
suggests that tasks applied to the experience curve effect should not be limited to the ones whose 
experiences are divided only by periods or workers. As long as the task is a human intellectual 
activity and its experiences are divided by factors other than periods or workers, the task will also 
be applicable to the experience curve effect because it has the common nature that each divided 
experience conveys only a subset of all the information that affects the worker’s intellectual 
activities. Nevertheless, the concept of the experience curve effect should not be expanded 
infinitely. It can be applied only to the tasks of workers, the performances of which differ 
depending on the amount of information the worker has.  
 
A2.2  The experience curve effect in the technology input 
A2.2.1  Dispersively embodied accumulative innovation in capital 
To understand the mechanism for the creation of non-accumulative innovations, it is first 
necessary to examine how workers are in contact with capital inputs and the accumulative 
innovations embodied in them at each production site. Any single machine or tool cannot embody 
all the accumulated innovations in human history. Only a portion of accumulated innovations are 
embodied in each machine or capital input. Furthermore, different types of machines or tools 
embody different kinds of accumulative innovations. This relationship between accumulative 
innovation and capital suggests that accumulative innovations are varied, divisible, and dispersed 
among capital inputs. If there are negative effects of congestion and redundancy in the 
embodiment of accumulative innovation in capital, this division of accumulative innovation 
improves productivity. Embodying more types of accumulative innovations in a machine or tool 
may make it a more general purpose machine or tool. In implementing a specific task, however, 
a general purpose machine or tool will be less useful and efficient than a specialized one because 
congestion and redundancy of the accumulative innovations will occur and reduce efficiency.  
     Suppose that there is only one economy in the world and that all workers in the economy 
are identical. Let  LKAfY ,, be a production function where Y is production, A is technology 
(accumulated innovations), K is capital input, and L is labor input. A can be interpreted as 
indicating the total amount of technology and, at the same time, the total number of varieties of 
technology in the economy. Let also τAbe the portion of A embodied on average in a unit of capital 
where τ is a positive parameter. To incorporate the idea that the division of A mitigates congestion 
and redundancy and improves efficiency for production, the following assumption is introduced: 
 
0


τ
Y
,                               (A2) 
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which indicates that the smaller the value of τ (i.e., the smaller the magnitude of congestion and 
redundancy), the larger the production Y.   
     On the other hand, if τ is too small, there is the possibility that a piece of A is not embodied 
in any part of K. Without embodying any portion of A, K is no longer a machine or tool but merely 
a pile of useless materials. Avoiding this abnormal situation requires a condition that any K must 
embody at least some portion of A. If 
K
τ
1
 , then the total amount of A used in the economy is 
AτAK  , and thus some portion of A is not embodied in any K, which indicates that the condition 
τ
K

1
is necessary for avoiding the abnormal situation and that
K
τ
1
 is the threshold value. As 
the rationale for the condition τ
K

1
with the threshold value
K
τ
1
 , it is assumed here that the 
total differential dY with respect to A and τ is positive such that  
 
dY 


dA
A
Y
0


dτ
τ
Y
 
 
for
K
τ
1
 , and thus 
 
0






τ
Y
dτ
dA
A
Y
dτ
dY
                          (A3) 
 
for
K
τ
1
 , which means that if τ is smaller than the threshold value
K
1
, then the reverse effect of 
the amount of A on production is much larger than the effect of the division of A on production. 
If τ
K

1
, then any portion of A is embodied in some K, and thereby 0
dτ
dA
and 0



τ
Y
dτ
dY
. 
     Combining the characteristics of τ shown in inequalities (A2) and (A3) indicates that the 
optimal value of τ is
K
1
. As a result of the rational behavior of firms, the optimal dispersion of 
accumulative innovation in capital is obtained when
K
τ
1
 , and thus the portion of A embodied 
on average in a unit of capital is always 
 
K
A
 
 
in the economy. A worker faces
K
A
units of accumulative innovations at any time when the worker 
uses a unit of capital.2 Because A indicates the total number of varieties of technology as well as 
the total amount of technology, dispersively embodied A in K indicates that a worker faces
K
1
of 
                                                          
2 In this paper, it is assumed that there is only one economy in the world. However, actually there are many smaller 
economies and a small economy may utilize only a small portion of A; i.e., the size of economy will matter to the 
optimal value of τ if there are many economies of various sizes. The problem of the size of economy as well as the 
problem of aggregation is discussed more in detail in Section A3. 
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varieties of A when the worker uses a unit of capital. 
 
A2.2.2  Specialized or generalized machines or tools 
Suppose that the amount of A is fixed; that is, no new variety of innovation is added. If K increases 
and A remains fixed, the proportion of A embodied in a unit of K becomes smaller because the 
proportion of A embodied in a unit of K is kept equal to
K
A
. A smaller
K
A
means that machines or 
tools become more specialized because the purpose of a machine or tool embodying less A will 
be more limited. The types of machines or tools used will change even if A does not increase. If 
K increases in this case, machines and tools will become more specialized and vice versa. The 
variety and type of machines or tools, that is, how specialized or generalized they are, depend not 
only on A but also on K.  
     Note, however, that generalized does not necessarily mean advanced. On the contrary, 
general purpose machines or tools are more primitive, and conversely, special purpose ones are 
more advanced. To be general purpose, machines or tools must rely more on basic or core 
technologies, and many specialized functions will be downgraded. 
 
A2.2.3  Effective technology input 
As argued in Section A2.1, the experience curve effect can be applied to a task as long as the task 
is an intellectual creative activity and the experiences can be divided by some factor. The 
experience curve effect is applicable to the activity of creating non-accumulative innovations to 
supplement imperfect accumulative innovations because (1) the activity is an intellectual creative 
activity and (A2) the experiences can be divided by varieties of A in K a worker encounters. A 
worker encounters a portion of the accumulated innovations (
K
A
) when the worker uses a unit of 
capital. The portion of accumulated innovations conveys a subset of all the information on 
accumulated innovations and a part of the subset overlaps with those conveyed in other portions 
of accumulated innovations that other workers encounter.  
     A worker encounters a unique combination of varieties of accumulative innovations (
K
A
) 
per unit capital. Let NA be a worker’s average encounter frequency (i.e., the worker’s experience) 
with each variety of accumulative innovations per unit capital in a period. As
K
A
increases, the 
number of varieties per unit capital increases; thus, NA will decrease because the probability of 
encountering each of the varieties in
K
A
 in a period decreases. The amount of
K
A
therefore will be 
inversely proportional to a worker’s experience on a variety per capital NA such that  
 
1







K
A
βN AA  
 
where
Aβ is a positive constant. Standardizing the worker’s average encounter frequency Aβ  
equal to unity, then  
 
1







K
A
N A .                             (A4) 
 
     Let
ANA
C , be the amount of inefficiency resulting from imperfect technology (which is 
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equivalent to imperfect accumulative innovations) embodied in capital when a worker utilizes a 
variety of accumulative innovations in
K
A
in a period. 
ANA
C , does indicates not the inefficiency 
initially generated by imperfect technology but the one remaining after being mitigated by 
workers’ innovations. Costs increase proportionally to increases in inefficiency; thus, 
ANA
C , also 
indicates costs. Conversely, 1
,

ANA
C can be interpreted as a productivity in supplementing 
imperfect technology by creating non-accumulative innovations when a worker utilizes a variety 
of accumulative innovations in
K
A
in a period. The creation of non-accumulative innovations will 
increase as the frequency of a worker encountering a variety of accumulative innovations in
K
A
 
increases (i.e., the productivity in supplementing imperfect technology by creating non-
accumulative innovations will increase as the number of experiences increases). Hence, the 
inefficiency 
ANA
C , will decrease as the encounter frequency increases. The experience curve 
effect indicates that inefficiency
ANA
C , declines (i.e., productivity
1
,

ANA
C increases) as a worker’s 
average encounter frequency on a variety per unit capital (NA) increases (i.e., 
K
A
becomes 
smaller) such that  
 
)1(
1,,
α
AANA NCC A
  ,                          (A5) 
 
where
1,AC is the inefficiency when 1AN . Note that α is the constant parameter ( 10  α ) used 
in equation (A1). 
     In addition, the “effective” amount of technology input per unit capital will increase as 
1
,

ANA
C increases (i.e., 
ANA
C , decreases) because the inefficiency is mitigated by an increased 
amount of workers’ innovations. Thus, the effective amount of technology input per unit capital 
when a worker uses a variety of accumulative innovations in
K
A
will be directly proportional to 
1
,

ANA
C  (i.e., inversely proportional to
ANA
C , ) such that 
 
ANA
A
A
C
γ
K
A
W
,
1







,                           (A6) 
 
where
AW is the effective amount of technology input per unit capital when a worker utilizes a 
unique combination of varieties of accumulative innovations in
K
A
, and
Aγ is a positive constant 
(i.e., 





K
A
γA indicates the amount of technology input per unit capital when a worker utilizes a 
unique combination of varieties of accumulative innovations in
K
A
in a period when 1, ANAC ). 
Substituting equations (A4) and (A5) into equation (A6) gives 
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 
α
A
A
α
A
A
α
AA
A
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A
A
K
A
C
γ
K
A
K
A
C
γ
K
A
NC
γ
K
A
C
γ
W
A






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

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













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






1,
1
1,
1
1,,
.       (A7) 
 
      As discussed in Section A2.2.1, the amount of technology embodied in a unit capital is
K
A
. 
Because technology is imperfect, however, that level of technology input cannot be effectively 
realized. At the same time, the inefficiency resulting from the imperfections is mitigated by non-
accumulative innovations created by ordinary workers even though it is not completely removed. 
Equation (A7) indicates that the magnitude of mitigation depends on
K
A
, and that, with the 
mitigation, technology input per unit capital is effectively not equal to
K
A
but directly 
proportionate to
α
A
A
A
K
A
C
γ
W 






1,
. By equation (A7), therefore, the effective technology input per 
unit capital ( A
~
) is 
 
α
AAA
K
A
ωWυA 






~
                          (A8) 
 
where υA and ωA are positive constant parameters and 









1A,
AA
A
C
γυ
ω .  
 
A2.3  The experience curve effect in the labor input 
The task of mitigating the inefficiency resulting from fragmented and incomplete information 
caused by the division of labor satisfies the condition for applying the experience curve effect 
(Section A2.1). As shown in Section A1.3, workers’ innovations are related to this inefficiency. 
In addition, production processes are divided by workers as part of the division of labor. Each 
worker encounters only a portion of the whole production process, a portion of the process 
conveys only a portion of information on the whole production process, and the information 
overlaps partially with that on other processes that other workers encounter. Hence, the experience 
curve effect can be applied to this task. Because labor is divided fully at the global level, 
inefficiency mitigation activities are correlated at the global level. 
     Let NL be the production processes a worker encounters (i.e., the experience of a worker); 
it indicates a proportion of all production processes in the economy (N), which is here normalized 
such that 1N . A proportion of the production process conveys a subset of all the information 
on the production process, and a part of the subset overlaps with subsets of information on 
processes that other workers encounter. Remember, in this discussion, I am assuming that there 
is only one economy in the world and that all workers are identical. Thus, because the experience 
of a worker (NL) is inversely proportionate to the number of workers, then  
 
L
β
N LL   
 
where L is the number of workers in the economy and
Lβ is a constant.  LNβ LL   indicates the 
total of all production processes in the economy such that NβL  . Because 1N , then 
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L
NL
1
 .                               (A9) 
 
Let
LNL
C , be the magnitude of inefficiency in a worker’s labor input caused by fragmented and 
incomplete information when each worker’s experience is
LN . Costs will increase proportionally 
with increases in inefficiency, and thus
LNL
C , also indicates costs. 
1
,

LNL
C can be interpreted as a 
productivity in a worker’s labor input, which increases as the amount of mitigation by the 
worker’s innovations increases. 
     
LNL
C , decreases as the amount of individually available information (i.e., experience) 
increases. The increased amount of information enables a worker to discover more correct 
mechanisms of the production processes, and this discovery reduces the inefficiency in a worker’s 
labor input. As mentioned previously, the experience curve effect can be applied to this 
inefficiency mitigation mechanism. The experience curve effect indicates that
LNL
C , declines as 
the experience of a worker (NL) increases (i.e., the number of workers deceases) such that  
 
)1(
1,,
α
LLNL NCC L
 ,                          (A10) 
 
where
1,LC is the inefficiency when 1LN  (i.e., NNL  and 1L ). Note again that α is the 
constant parameter ( 10  α ) used in equation (A1). 
     In addition, because the amount of a worker’s effective provision of labor input increases 
as productivity ( 1
,

LNL
C ) increases (i.e., 
LNL
C , decreases), then the amount of a worker’s effective 
provision of labor input (
L
WL ) is directly proportional to 1
,

LNL
C  (i.e., inversely proportional to
LNL
C , ) such that  
 
LNL
LL
C
γ
L
W
,
 ,                            (A11) 
 
where
LW is the total amount of workers’ effective provision of labor input that is lowered by the 
inefficiency resulting from fragmented and incomplete information, and
Lγ is a constant (i.e., Lγ  
indicates the output per worker in a period when 1, LNLC ). Substituting equations (A9) and 
(A10) into equation (A11) gives 
 
 
α
L
L
α
L
L
α
LL
L
NL
L
L L
C
γ
L
LC
γ
L
NC
γ
L
C
γ
W
L 1,
1
1,
1
1,,


.             (A12) 
 
     The inefficiency caused by fragmented and incomplete information constrains the effective 
labor provision by workers. As division of labor is widened (i.e., as L increases), the effective 
labor provision by workers is more constrained. Hence, the labor input that is effectively provided 
by workers is not simply proportional to L. Equation (A12) indicates that, instead of L, the labor 
input effectively provided by workers is directly proportional to α
L
L
L L
C
γ
W
1,
 ; thus, the effective 
labor input L
~
is  
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α
LLL LωWυL 
~
,                          (A13) 
 
where υL and ωL are positive constant parameters and
1L,
LL
L
C
γυ
ω  .  
 
A2.4  The experience curve effect and the capital input 
As with A
~
and L
~
, an inefficiency with regard to the capital input K may exist, and this inefficiency 
may be solved by intellectual activities of workers. If such inefficiency exists, the effective capital 
input would not be equal to K. However, I was unable to find a factor that significantly 
necessitates a worker’s intellectual activities to lessen inefficiencies in utilizing capital, in 
particular inefficiencies that result from imperfectness or incompleteness of information on 
capital. Therefore, I have assumed that capital input does not necessitate workers’ innovations. 
However, capital input is constrained by another element that is basically irrelevant to workers’ 
intellectual activities. It is impossible for each worker to use all capital inputs existing in the 
economy; each worker can access only a fraction of the total amount. This accessibility constraint 
sets bounds to the use of capital. Nevertheless, the accessibility is basically irrelevant in terms of 
worker innovation because accessibilities of workers in the world are not correlated with each 
other at the global level and thus it is not difficult for a worker to find a correct way to access 
capital inputs when an unexpected incident occurs. Therefore, information on accessibility is not 
incomplete, and it is enough for a worker to know only local information with regard to 
accessibility to capital. Therefore, there is little differentiation among workers in finding correct 
ways to access capital inputs, and as a consequence, there is little differentiation in the workers’ 
experiences. 
     Machines or tools are not necessarily in constant operation during production; they are idle 
during some periods. A worker often uses various machines or tools in turn in a period, or 
equivalently several workers often use the same machine or tool in turn in a period. Let σK  be 
the portion of K used by a worker on average where  10  σσ  is a positive parameter. 
Because the total sum of K used in the economy must not be smaller than K, σKLK  , σ
L

1
, 
and thereby 1
1
 σ
L
 for L1 . It is highly likely that production increases if more K is used per 
worker, in which case, for a production function  σ,A,K,LfY  ,  
 
0


σ
Y
.                              (A14) 
 
Condition (A14) and the constraint 1
1
 σ
L
lead to a unique steady state value of σ such that
1σ , which indicates that each worker uses all K existing in the economy. Clearly, that is 
impossible—accessibility to capital is not limitless. Even if a worker wants to use K installed at 
a distant location, it is usually meaningless to do so because it is too costly. Thus, it is highly 
likely that there is a boundary of accessibility with regard to location. A worker can use only a 
small portion of K installed in the small area around the worker. That is, the value of the parameter 
σ has an upper bound such that  
 
σσ
L

1
,                             (A15) 
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where  10  σσ  is a positive constant. With the upper boundσ , by conditions (A14) and 
(A15), the optimal portion of K used by a worker on average ( K
~
) for L1  is  
 
KσK 
~
.                              (A16) 
 
     The parameter σ  represents a worker’s accessibility limit to capital with regard to 
location.3 The average value of σ  in the economy will depend on the availability of physical 
transportation facilities. Location constraints, however, are not limited to physical transportation 
facilities. For example, law enforcement, regulations, the financial system, and other factors will 
also influence accessibility. The value of σ  reflects the combined effects of all of these factors. 
The values of σ  with regard to workers who are obliged to work at a designated location using 
fixed machines in a factory (e.g., workers in manufacturing industries) may be nearly identical. 
However, values for workers in other jobs (e.g., in service industries) will be heterogeneous 
depending on conditions. Even in manufacturing industries, workers engage in a variety of 
activities (e.g., negotiating with financial institutions or marketing), so the values of σ will also 
be heterogeneous in manufacturing industries. 
     Suppose that the density of capital per unit area is identical in the industrial area in the 
economy with an upper bound ofσ .4 An increase of the total sum of K indicates an increase of 
the density of K in the industrial area; thus, the portion of K used by a worker also increases at 
the same rate as K. On the other hand, an increase of the total sum of L does not indicate any 
change of the density of K in the industrial area, and the portion of K used by a worker does not 
change.  
 
A3  Production function 
A3.1  Effective production function 
Suppose that production requires some strictly positive minimum amounts of technology ( A ), 
capitals ( K ), and labors ( L ). In addition, suppose that A , K , and L each do not exhibit 
increasing marginal product; that is, 
 
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a production function  L,K,AfY  . If   0,,lim
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2
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LKAf
K
, and 
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0
,,
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2
2



 L
LKAf
L
, then for sufficiently large A , K , and L , the production function is 
approximated by the production function in which any of A , K , and L exhibits constant marginal 
product such that 
 
    54321 ψψLψKψAψY  ,                   (A17) 
 
where ψi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) are constants. Here, by the assumption that production requires some 
strictly positive minimum amounts of A , K , and L , then   0,,0 LKf ,   0,0, LAf , and 
  00,, KAf . Among the approximated production functions (A17), the production function 
                                                          
3 If there are many economies with various sizes, each economy’s value of σ  may be different. The effect of the size 
of economy on σ  is discussed in Section A3. 
4 An industrial area is considered here to be an area that is appropriate for economic activities and excludes deserts, 
deep forests, mountains, and other inaccessible areas. This concept is important when we consider the size of economy, 
which will be examined in detail in Section A3.   
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that also satisfies this minimum requirement condition is  
 
LKAψY 1 . 
 
If ψ1 is standardized such that 11 ψ , then 
 
 LKAY  .                             (A18) 
 
     Production function (A18) appears intuitively understandable. Each of L workers uses K
capital inputs per worker with A amount of technologies embedded in each K .5  However, 
production function (A18) cannot be realized as it is, because there are various constraints caused 
by various imperfections, as I argued in Section A2. The effective amounts of technology and 
labor inputs are not A and L but A
~
and L
~
, and the portion of K usable for a worker on average is 
not K but K
~
. Hence, the approximated production function is effectively  
 
LKAY
~~~
 .                             (A19) 
 
Here, by equations (A8), (A13), and (A16), 
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Rational firms utilize inputs fully so as to maximize Y, and by equations (A19) and (A20), the 
approximate effective production function (AEPF) can be represented as 
 
ααα
LA LKAωωσY
 1 . 
 
A3.2  The approximate effective production function 
AEPF has the following properties, which have been widely assumed for production functions 
and are consistent with data across economies and time periods: a Cobb-Douglas functional form, 
a labor share of about 70%, and strict Harrod neutrality. The function therefore also has 
diminishing marginal products of labor, capital, and technology.  
 
A3.2.1  Cobb-Douglas functional form 
     The rationale and microfoundation of the Cobb-Douglas functional form have been long 
argued, but no consensus has been reached. For example, Jones (2005) argues that Cobb-Douglas 
production functions are induced if it is assumed that ideas are drawn from Pareto distributions. 
Growiec (2008), however, shows that Clayton-Pareto class of production functions that nest both 
the Cobb-Douglas functions and the CES are induced by assuming that each of the unit factor 
productivities is Pareto-distributed, dependence between these marginal distributions is captured 
by the Clayton copula, and that local production functions are CES. AEPF provides an alternative 
rationale and microfoundation of the Cobb-Douglas functional form. AEPF is the typical Cobb-
Douglas production function, and the keys of its Cobb-Douglas functional form are workers’ 
innovations and the experience curve effect.    
 
A3.2.2  A 70% labor share 
                                                          
5 Remember that all workers are assumed to be identical.  
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     The parameter α indicates the labor share in the distribution of income. Data in most 
economies show that labor share is about 70% (Table 1). No persuasive rationale has been 
presented on why the labor share is usually about 70%, but AEPF can offer one. In AEPF, the 
value of α is derived from the experience curve effect, and the average value of α has been shown 
to be about 70% in many empirical studies on the experience curve effect (e.g., Hirsch, 1956; 
Womer and Patterson, 1983; Dutton and Thomas, 1984; Womer, 1984; Ayres and Martinas, 1992: 
Williams and Terzian, 1993; OECD/IEA, 2000), which implies that workers’ average rate of 
reducing inefficiencies is bounded. This boundary probably exists because newly added 
information decreases as the number of experiences increases and also because the marginal 
efficiency in a worker’s analyzing, utilizing, and managing information (i.e., in creating 
innovations) decreases as the amount of information increases.  
 
A3.2.3  Strict Harrod neutrality and balanced growth  
Because AEPF is a Cobb-Douglas production function, any of Harrod, Hicks, and Solow 
neutralities can be assumed as the type of technology change embodied in it. However, AEPF is 
Harrod neutral in the strict sense such that a unit of A is neither α
α
A 

1  (Solow neutral) nor αA  
(Hicks neutral) but 1A because a unit of A is defined before the functional form of AEPF is 
induced using the experience curve effect. This strict Harrod neutrality is a necessary condition 
for a balanced growth path. In the balanced growth equilibrium, the capital intensity of the 
economy
Y
K
is kept constant, and
L
Y
, 
L
K
, and A grow at the same rate. Because AEPF is strictly 
Harrod neutral, it is possible for a growth model based on AEPF to achieve a balanced growth 
path. 
     At first glance, the essential factor behind the strict Harrod neutrality in AEPF appears to 
be that both A
~
and L
~
are subject to workers’ intellectual activities and the experience curve effect. 
However, this view is somewhat superficial. In a deeper sense, there is a more essential factor. 
For strict Harrod neutrality to be achieved, it is necessary that both AEPF with constant L and 
AEPF with constant A be homogeneous of degree 1 with regard to (A and K) and (K and L), 
respectively. These conditions are satisfied in AEPF because A
~
is
α
A
K
A
ω 




 , and A
~
therefore is not 
proportionate simply to A but to
K
A
. That is, strict Harrod neutrality requires various types of 
accumulative innovations in A to be dispersed in K, which means that A and K are closely related 
(like two sides of the same coin). Production (Y) increases at the same rate as A and K; thus, the 
capital intensity
K
Y
is constant.  
     As shown in Section A2, the nature of dispersive accumulative innovations originates in 
the optimization of firms to minimize inefficiencies caused by congestion and redundancy of A 
(i.e., to maximize effects of the division of A). Because technology input is optimal when capital 
is as specialized as possible, then capital is actually as specialized as possible by the optimizing 
behaviors of firms, which implies that the very essence of the strict Harrod neutrality and the 
balanced growth path lies in the optimizing behaviors of rational firms.  
 
A3.3  The size of the economy and aggregation  
Because AEPF has the Cobb-Douglas functional form, it is impossible to simply disaggregate it 
unless any disaggregated capital labor ratio
L
K
has the same value. AEPF offers an explanation for 
this difficulty of disaggregation (or equivalently aggregation). The effective labor input L
~
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indicates that division of labor is a crucial factor for Cobb-Douglas production functions. Labor 
is divided at the global level, and even a division of labor in a small factory is a part of the global-
level division of labor. Division of labor cannot be completed within a factory, but all divided 
labor inputs are correlated and not viable alone. Thereby, the global-level division of labor must 
be considered even if we construct a local production function. However, variables reflecting the 
global-level division of labor (e.g., the total number of workers in the world) are not included in 
local Cobb-Douglas production functions; that is, the effect of the global-level division of labor 
is ignored. The neglect of this effect matters more when local Cobb-Douglas production functions 
are aggregated to higher levels because the neglected correlations of labor inputs are not 
accounted for in the aggregation. Therefore, it is not possible to aggregate local Cobb-Douglas 
production functions by simply summing them up. 
     A similar problem may arise when a Cobb-Douglas production function is applied to 
multiple economies of different sizes. Large economies exhibit properties more similar to the 
global economy, and small economies exhibit properties that are less similar, which implies that 
a Cobb-Douglas production function cannot be applied equally to large and small economies. I 
have assumed that there is only one economy in the world, but if multiple economies are allowed, 
AEPF may have to incorporate the size of economy, for example, by including additional 
variables. However, the same AEPF can be applied to large and small economies without 
consideration of the size of economy because the size of an economy relates not only to L
~
but also 
to A
~
and K
~
.  
     Let  10  SS be the size of economy, and 1S indicates the entire global economy. Here, 
S is defined independently of endogenous variables Y and K but by an exogenous variable such 
as the spatial size of an economy’s industrialized areas. Given identical population density in 
industrialized areas across economies, S is directly proportionate to a given L. If this spatial 
(population) size of economy is considered, A
~
, K
~
, and L
~
need to be modified. Suppose an 
economy’s Y, K, L, and S are YX, KX, LX, and SX, respectively, and A is internationally common. 
First, the effective capital input 
XKσ  needs to be standardized by the spatial size parameter SX. 
A worker’s accessibility to capital does not depend simply on KX anymore but on the spatial 
density of capital
X
X
S
K
; thus, the capital inputs a worker can access are not 
XKσ but
X
X
S
K
σ . Hence, 
the effective capital input is not
XK
~
but
X
X
S
K
~
. Similarly, the effective technology input
XA
~
 needs 
to be standardized by the spatial size of economy SX. The dispersive nature of A implies that, 
although any variety of A is available to any economy, a small economy will not utilize all 
varieties in A but will specialize in a portion of the varieties in A. The amount of varieties an 
economy utilizes will depend on its size. Larger economies utilize more varieties in A, and smaller 
economies use fewer. With this conjecture, equation (A4) (
1







X
A
K
A
N ) needs to be adjusted 
by the size of economy SX such that
1







X
X
A
K
AS
N ; thus, by substituting
1







X
X
A
K
AS
N into 
equation (A7), the effective technology input is not
XA
~
but
X
α
X AS
~
. Finally, the effective labor input 
is no longer
XL
~
. As was mentioned above, S is directly proportionate to L given an identical 
population density. A larger S (L) superficially indicates a wider division of labor and more 
fragmented and incomplete information and vice versa. Thereby, an economy with a larger S (L) 
superficially looks more strongly affected by the inefficiency of fragmented and incomplete 
information than a smaller economy even though labor inputs in both large and small economies 
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are equally divided at the global level. To remove this distortion, 
LN in equation (A9) (
X
L
L
N
1
 ) 
must be artificially transformed to
X
X
L
L
S
N  on the assumption that the size of the economy 
artificially becomes 1
XS times as large (i.e., the same as the whole global economy). Hence, by 
substituting
X
X
L
L
S
N  into equation (A12), XL
~
is modified to
α
X
X
S
L
~
. Nevertheless, the actual labor 
input of the economy is SX times smaller; thus, 
α
X
X
S
L
~
must be multiplied by SX to be used as the 
amount of labor input of the economy. The effective labor input is thereby not
XL
~
but
X
α
X LS
~1 . 
     Substituting
X
α
X AS
~
,
X
X
S
K
~
, and
X
α
X LS
~1 for A
~
, K
~
, and L
~
, respectively, in equation (A19) as 
the effective technology, capital and labor inputs, AEPF adjusted for economy size is 
 
XXXX
α
X
X
X
X
α
XX LKALS
S
K
ASY
~~~~
~
~ 1   .                   (A21) 
 
Equation (A21) is exactly the same as equation (A19). The spatial (population) size of the 
economy therefore does not matter, and AEPF can be applied equally to large and small 
economies. In addition, because equation (A21) holds for any size economy, simple comparisons 
of the values of the parameters σ , ωA, and ωL between large and small economies are possible, 
which enables us to evaluate the effects of heterogeneous parameter values on production. If 
estimated parameter values are different between two economies when the same AEPF is used, 
these different values should be interpreted not as a result of distortions caused by size but as 
reflecting intrinsically different economic structures between the two economies.  
     It must be noted, however, that aggregation is still impossible as is true with other Cobb-
Douglas production functions unless
L
K
is identical. Although S does not matter to the relation 
among Y, K, and L, aggregation demands an additional more restrictive constraint on the relation 
among Y, K, and L such that  212121 , LLKKfYY  , where Yi, Ki, and Li indicate Y, K, and 
L for economy i. It is not the spatial size (S) but the size of Y that matters.  
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